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CONTINUOUS COMPLIANCE MONITORING IN ERP
SYSTEMS - A METHOD FOR IDENTIFYING
SEGREGATION OF DUTIES CONFLICTS
Patrick Wolf, Nick Gehrke1
Abstract
Segregation of Duties (SOD) can be seen as one major class of control activities within a
company's Internal Control framework, contributing to the reliability of financial reporting. In
recent years, SOD controls in terms of user access rights have experienced a surge of attention in
particular, mostly due to the growing reliance of business processes on ERP systems. This paper
presents a method for automatically identifying SOD conflicts in user access rights as one
component of a continuous compliance monitoring framework. The paper further demonstrates the
application of the proposed method in a real world project.

1. Introduction
In recent years, the growing number of corporate scandals (e.g. Barings Bank, Enron, Worldcom,
Siemens, Société Générale) has led to tighter regulatory and statutory requirements regarding a
company's Internal Control over Financial Reporting (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley-Act). According to the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), Internal Control
can be defined as "a process, effected by an entity's board of directors, management and other
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the
following categories: 1. Effectiveness and efficiency of operations. 2. Reliability of financial
reporting. 3. Compliance with applicable laws and regulations" [6]. To ensure the achievement of
these objectives, COSO proposes the implementation of a company-wide Internal Control
framework consisting of five interrelated components: Control Environment, Risk Assessment,
Control Activities, Information and Communication, and Monitoring [6]. The need for
implementing a suitable and available Internal Control framework is also underlined by the
aforementioned regulatory and statutory requirements [12].
Within a company's Internal Control framework, Segregation of Duties (SOD) can be classified as a
major class of control activities. It contributes to the reliability of financial reporting [13] by
preventing any single employee from having complete control over all phases (authorization,
custody, record keeping and reconciliation) of a business transaction [15, 18], thus, avoiding a
conflict of interests and preventing fraud [13, 14]. The term "fraud" is used in accordance with the
1
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International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 240 and refers to "an intentional act by one or more
individuals among management, those charged with governance, employees, or third parties,
involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage" [14]. If a company's Internal
Control is not working effectively due to inadequate SOD, then fraudulent activities, such as
misappropriation of assets and fraudulent financial reporting, may not be prevented which, in turn,
could result in a material misstatement in the financial statements of the respective company [14].
According to a survey recently published by the accounting and consulting firm
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the average loss from fraud over two years per company in 2007
was US$ 2,420,700 [16].
Considering the relevance of SOD for the effectiveness of a company's Internal Control over
Financial Reporting, this paper proposes a method for identifying existing SOD conflicts in the user
access rights of different enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems. From our practical
experience, there is a strong demand for such a monitoring method, especially due to the growing
reliance of business processes on ERP systems [9] and the latest corporate scandals (e.g. the
Siemens AG has lately chosen Security Weaver as its global software platform for monitoring SOD
conflicts2). While the continuous monitoring of SOD conflicts in ERP systems combined with the
continuous monitoring of system transactions and system settings is recently marketed under the
term "continuous compliance monitoring" by several consulting firms, such as PwC and KPMG,
and software vendors, such as ACL CCM, Approva BizRights and Security Weaver, there seems to
be a lack of scientific debate regarding continuous monitoring methods. This paper tries to fill this
gap and is based on the Design Science paradigm [11]. The proposed method addresses a relevant
business problem (see introduction) and constitutes a viable artefact according to Hevner et al.
Research rigor is achieved by applying the established method engineering approach within the
construction process. The practicability of the method is then evaluated in a real world project. The
research contribution of the paper can be seen in bridging the gap between the practical and
theoretical debate regarding continuous compliance monitoring.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In chapter 2, the method engineering approach
is presented as the theoretical foundation of the method development process. Based on the
understanding of the five constituent elements of a method (activities, outcomes, techniques, roles
and metamodel), chapter 3 focuses on describing the most important elements of our proposed
method for identifying SOD conflicts in system-based user access rights (activities, outcomes and
techniques). Thus, the elements metamodel and roles will not be covered within this paper. In
chapter 4, the method is evaluated by applying it in a real world project. Finally, a conclusion is
given and further research needs are outlined.

2. Method Elements and Method Engineering
According to Brinkkemper, the word method comes from the Greek "methodos", meaning way of
investigation [4]. In the context of systems development, he defines a method as "an approach […]
based on a specific way of thinking, consisting of directions and rules, structured in a systematic
way in development activities with corresponding development products" [4]. Further definitions of
methods have been given, for example, by [1], [2], [8] or [18]. A synopsis of these and other
definitions can be found at [3] who derive four fundamental defining attributes of a method: goal
oriented, systematically structured, principles-based, and intersubjectively repeatable.
2
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Method Engineering (ME) is an approach which has emerged in the IS field in the nineteen-eighties
due to the "fundamental observation […] that no one method is equally suitable to all kinds of
problem domains" [19]. Based on this observation, ME can be understood as an engineering
discipline which focuses on the systematic design, construction and adoption of methods for various
purposes (e.g. information systems development) [7]. Here, a method is not conceived "as a single
intertwined and interdependent entity but as a set of disparate fragments" [10].
Gutzwiller has analyzed several ME approaches and derived the following five general elements of
a method: "activity", "role", "outcome", "technique", and "metamodel" [8]. Again, an overview of
alternative definitions can be found at [3]. According to Gutzwiller, an activity is a functional unit
of action which aims at creating one or more defined outcomes (e.g. a functional specification).
Activities may consist of sub-activities (forming a hierarchical structure) and can be ordered in a
sequence (procedure model). Techniques describe in detail how a certain outcome or a group of
logically interrelated outcomes is created. The metamodel is the conceptual data model of the
outcomes and visualizes their overall interrelationships. Finally, roles are aggregations of certain
activities required to fulfil a certain function within the company and are normally performed by
employees or organizational units [8].
Based on the aforementioned understanding, the following chapter focuses on describing the
activities, outcomes and techniques of our method for identifying SOD conflicts in ERP-systems as
well as the interrelationships of these elements. Neither metamodels nor role aspects will be
covered in this paper. The application of the method in a real world project is demonstrated in
chapter 4.

3. Activities, Outcomes and Techniques of the Method
The activities, outcomes and techniques of the proposed method are illustrated in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1: Activities, outcomes and techniques of the SOD conflicts identification method
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Process Scoping
The process scoping activity is the starting point of the presented method and aims at identifying
those processes which will later be subject to the SOD analysis. This selection should be based on a
thorough assessment of each process in terms of the probability of fraud occurrence and the
expected extent of such events. Typical examples of high risk processes in most companies are the
purchase-to-pay process (P2P) or the order-to-cash (O2C) process. Assessment techniques, like
interviews and questionnaires, should especially take into account the complexity of a certain
process, such as degree of automatization and interfaces, past fraud cases, existing opportunities to
commit fraud (e.g. ineffective controls), as well as employees' incentives (e.g. existing pressure,
personal fraud justification) [17].
Process Analysis
The aim of the process analysis activity is to gain a thorough understanding of the selected
processes by decomposing each process in its flow of activities and by identifying the
organizational entities and information systems (e.g. ERP systems) which are involved in
performing these activities. Techniques that should be used for gathering the required information
are interviews, questionnaires and observations. Process modelling tools (e.g. IDS Scheer ARIS,
BOC ADONIS) might be used in order to facilitate the systematic creation of the process models.
SOD Ruleset Specification
The main objective of the third activity is to specify the corporate SOD ruleset which constitutes the
total set of SOD conflicts considered relevant for the regarded processes. An SOD conflict is
defined as a combination of exactly two process activities which hold the risk of fraud if both are
performed by the same individual. SOD conflicts are relevant if both the probability of their
exploitation and the expected damage resulting from such an exploitation exceed a threshold
depending on a company's risk appetite [5]. This threshold ensures the manageability of the ruleset
by eliminating all non-relevant conflicts. The conflicts contained in the ruleset should be formulated
in a system-independent way which guarantees that the ruleset is overall applicable and not tailored
to a specific system environment. This becomes especially important when dealing with more than
one company (e.g. an affiliated group) and different system environments (e.g. SAP, Baan). An
exemplary extract of a ruleset is given in Tab. 1.
Process
P2P

P2P
P2P

SOD Conflict
Create & Maintain Vendor
Records vs. Process Vendor
Invoices

Risk
A user could set up fictitious vendor accounts (or
alter existing accounts inappropriately) and create
fictitious invoices resulting in unauthorized
payments.
Process Vendor Invoices vs.
A user could process payments for fictitious or
Process Outgoing Payments
invalid invoices.
Create & Maintain Vendor
A user could set up fictitious vendor accounts (or
Records vs. Process Outgoing
alter existing accounts inappropriately) and initiate
Payments
payments to these fictitious vendors.
Tab. 1: Exemplary extract of a SOD ruleset for the P2P process
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SOD Ruleset Translation
The next activity of the proposed method is based on the premise that all or most of the process
activities considered in the SOD ruleset (e.g. "Create & Maintain Purchase Order") are actually
performed in an ERP system, thus requiring the translation of the system-independent ruleset in the
specific transaction codes, function codes, authorization objects, etc. of the respective system.
Again, this activity becomes particularly important when dealing with several subsidiaries of an
affiliated group which all perform basically the same processes (e.g. P2P) on heterogeneous ERP
systems (e.g. SAP, Oracle Financials, Baan). In such a case, the ruleset must be consistently tailored
to each ERP system. A practical example is given in paragraph 4.3.
Live Data Extraction and Transformation
After having translated the SOD ruleset, the fifth activity aims at extracting the current user access
rights from the relevant database tables of the productive ERP systems and transforming that data in
a standardized format for analysis purposes. In order to automate the extraction, the implementation
of customized Standard Query Language (SQL)-scripts which may be triggered periodically is
recommended. The first step in creating such a script consists of identifying the relevant database
tables which contain the user access rights data. In an ERP system supporting purely role based
access rights, the tables illustrated in Tab. 2 should be considered at minimum.
Table
User Master Data
Transaction Master Data
Role Master Data
Mapping Users To Roles

Description
Contains all users of the system
Contains all possible business transactions supported by the system
Contains all roles defined in the system
Contains all relationships of users and roles. A role can be assigned to
multiple users and a user can have multiple roles (m:n).
Mapping Roles to
Contains all relationships of roles and business transactions. A role can
Transactions
contain multiple business transactions and a transaction can be assigned
to multiple roles (m:n).
Tab. 2: Relevant user access rights tables in a role based access rights system

The automated transformation of the contents of the identified tables in a standardized format by
using appropriate SQL queries can then be seen as the second step. However, in the case of ERP
systems whose authorization mechanisms are not purely role based, additional data transformations
must be developed. Typical issues which might be encountered are: (1) access rights are directly
assigned to users without using roles or in addition to existing roles; or (2) roles do not only contain
business transactions (positive list), but also entries with explicit negations of transactions (negative
list). In such cases, constellations must be considered where one role grants one user access to a
specific transaction and another role negates this access at the same time.
SOD Analysis
Within this activity, the standardized data extracts from the previous step are taken and analyzed in
order to determine existing SOD conflicts in the user access rights assigned for the productive ERP
systems. For each user and each conflict of the translated SOD ruleset, it must be checked if the
respective user disposes of sufficient access rights to perform both activities of the analyzed
conflict. In such a case, the result report of the SOD analysis should show the existing conflict
together with additional information (e.g. user ID, conflicting access rights) to allow the
remediation of the conflicting access rights. An example of a report is given in paragraph 4.4.
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4. Application of the Method in a Real World Project
This chapter aims at demonstrating the application of the proposed method in a real world project.
Firstly, a short overview is given describing the objectives and the general requirements of the
project. Subsequently, the aforementioned activities, techniques and outcomes are described in the
context of the project. Due to the sensitivity of the subject, all data have been made anonymous.
Project Overview
In the forefront of our project, the client had started to implement a continuous SOD compliance
process based on the analysis tool Security Weaver (SW). Although SW is primarily focussed on
SAP installations, the scope of the software was extended within the project to cover other NONSAP systems (e.g. Exact Globe, Baan, Oracle Financials) as well. At the end, more than 60
worldwide located installations of NON-SAP systems were integrated in the automated SOD
compliance process. The activities performed in order to analyze the user access rights within those
systems are illustrated in Fig. 2 and described below: (1) the current user access rights are extracted
from each productive NON-SAP system on a regular basis; (2) the extracted data is transformed in a
common standardized format; (3) the standardized data is transferred to the central SW instance
(e.g. via FTP), uploaded and analyzed; (4)/(5) the results are made accessible via web interface
allowing the system owners to download the reports for the purpose of remediation.
4
5
2

1
Data Extraction

Decentral
Decentral
Decentral

Non
SAP
Non
SAP
Non
SAP
System
Systems
Systems

3
File Transfer

CSV-Files
User Rights

Central
Security Weaver

User WebInterface
for decentralized
Companies

Report
Download

SoD Report
SoD Report
SoD Report
Company xxx

Fig. 2: Activities within an exemplary continuous SOD compliance process

In the context of the overall SOD project, the main objective of our sub-project was to initially
analyse the user access rights established in the productive NON-SAP systems of several selected
subsidiaries with regard to existing SOD conflicts. The scope of the analysis was further limited to
cover only P2P-related conflicts as well as some conflicts relating to the finance and the system
administration process.
SOD Ruleset Specification
The SOD ruleset for the P2P process had already been defined by our client and, thus, marked the
initial point of our sub-project. To obtain the ruleset, the client first identified all relevant activities
performed within his P2P processes and then created an SOD matrix based on these activities to
derive the potential conflicts. Tab. 3 shows an excerpt of the SOD matrix for the P2P process. The
crosses indicate existing conflicts between the activities.
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CMVR
PVI
POP
MBA
PIP
X
X
CMVR X
X
PVI
X
X
X
POP
X
X
MBA
X
PIP
3
Tab. 3: Exemplary SOD matrix for the P2P process

SOD Ruleset Translation
The system-specific translation of the P2P ruleset is demonstrated on the example of the NON-SAP
system Exact Globe. Within Globe, the table "pwfunc" contains all transactions supported by the
system. Tab. 4 shows an extract of this table.
transactionID
650888
650892
650896
650925
652065
652066

exename
Transactiontitle
EBUDGETALLOCATION
Budgets
BALANCELIST
Receivables history
BALANCELIST
Payables history
ENTRYREPORT
To be processed
EFENTRY
Invoices
EFENTRY
To create credit notes
Tab. 4: Extract of transactions supported by Exact Globe

To translate a specific conflict of the SOD ruleset, it is necessary to identify all transactionIDs
contained in the table "pwfunc" which logically belong to one of the two activities that make up a
conflict and assign those transactionIDs to the respective activity. It is immediately obvious that this
activity requires a profound knowledge of the regarded ERP system and the transactions it supports.
Tab. 5 illustrates the process activity "Process Vendor Invoices" tailored to Exact Globe.
Process activity
TransactionID
GroupID Transaction Title
Process Vendor Invoices
G0000000018
08
Exchange rates
Process Vendor Invoices
G0000000054
NO
Transactions
Process Vendor Invoices
G0000000062
NO
Financial entries
Process Vendor Invoices
G0000000060
04
Enter
Process Vendor Invoices
G0000000068
NO
Make recurring purchase entries
Process Vendor Invoices
G0000000063
NO
Make recurring general journal entries
Process Vendor Invoices
G0000000121
07
Invoices & Bank/Cash
Process Vendor Invoices
G0000000102
08
Invoices & Bank/Cash
Process Vendor Invoices
G0000000119
04
Process
Process Vendor Invoices
G65047
NO
Purchase
Process Vendor Invoices
G65076
NO
General journal
Process Vendor Invoices
G65303
07
Exchange rates
Tab. 5: Exemplary translation of the activity "Process Vendor Invoices"

It should be noted that a user needs only one of the transactionIDs marked with a "NO" in the
GroupID column of the table above to perform the activity "Process Vendor Invoices" within Exact
Globe ("or"-conjunction). On the other hand, values other than "NO" in the GroupID column point
out that a user must possess all transactionIDs belonging to the same group in order to be able to
3

Legend of abbreviations: Create & Maintain Vendor Records (CMVR), Process Vendor Invoices (PVI), Process
Outgoing Payments (POP), Maintain Bank Accounts (MBA), Process Incoming Payments (PIP)
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perform the activity "Process Vendor Invoices". In the case of group "04", only entering AND
processing invoices is deemed critical. Users with access to only one of these transactions cannot
perform the activity "Process Vendor Invoices" on their own.
Live Data Extraction and SOD Analysis
For obtaining the user access rights data from the productive NON-SAP systems, customized SQL
scripts were created and implemented. The data transfer was performed using standardized csvfiles. The access rights data contained in the files was then uploaded into the central SW instance.
Subsequently, the analysis of the user access rights data in terms of existing SOD conflicts was
performed automatically in SW by applying the appropriate system-specific SOD ruleset to the
uploaded data. A simplified exemplary result report showing one identified SOD conflict
("Maintain Vendor Records vs. Process Vendor Invoices") for the user "4711" is depicted in Tab. 6.
The report also indicates the transactionIDs causing the conflict, the roles of the user containing the
conflicting transactionIDs and the respective process activities to which the transactionIDs have
been mapped. Based on the report, the existing conflict could be solved, for example, by revoking
the user's access to transactionID 650476.
Company

User

100

4711

100

4711

100

4711

Conflict

Process Activity

Role

Maintain Vendor Records vs.
Process Vendor Invoices
Maintain Vendor Records vs.
Process Vendor Invoices
Maintain Vendor Records vs.
Process Vendor Invoices

Maintain Vendor
Master Records
Maintain Vendor
Master Records
Process Vendor
Invoices

Sales
invoices23456
00_PURCHASE
AGENT
00_PURCHASE
AGENT

Transaction-ID

650124
650120
650476

Tab. 6: Simplified report of identified SOD conflicts

At higher organizational levels, more aggregated reports are commonly demanded (e.g. existing
SOD conflicts over all entities). Fig. 3 shows a scatter plot which we used within our project for
reporting the initial status of SOD conflicts in several selected entities (C001 to C007) and the
status after a first remediation (visualized via arrows) to the client's management.

Fig. 3: SOD report graph showing the number of conflicts per entity (C001 to C007)
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While the scatter plot in Fig. 3 shows only the total number of SOD conflicts for each entity, the
graph in Fig. 4 gives more detailed information on the frequency of each single conflict. On the xaxis of the graph, the analyzed conflict IDs are shown (e.g. AP01 to AP15), whereas the y-axis
indicates the percentage of ERP system users within the regarded entities (C001 to C007) having
the respective conflict. A broken line occurs if a conflict is not applicable to the considered system.

Fig. 4: SOD report graph showing the frequency of each conflict per entity

5. Conclusion
This paper proposed a method for identifying existing SOD conflicts in the user access rights of
different ERP systems. The method consists of six interrelated activities whose practicability was
evaluated in a real world project. From this evaluation, some "lessons learned" can be derived:
1. The creation of a complete, accurate and consistent SOD ruleset without redundancies is highly
important as it constitutes the basis for all subsequent activities. Thus, an independent quality
assurance assessment of the ruleset should be performed prior to any implementation activities.
2. The system-specific translation of the ruleset demands highly experienced system users to
ensure the accuracy and completeness of the mapping. Again, an independent quality assurance
assessment has proved to be important.
3. In the case of ERP systems whose authorization mechanisms are not purely role-based,
additional support tools for transforming the data into the required format had to be developed.
These additional efforts should be considered when planning similar projects.
4. The redesign of user access rights in order to ensure compliance with the SOD principle may
result in a substantial change of organizational work routines, e.g. if employees are not allowed
to perform certain activities in the ERP systems anymore due to existing SOD violations. These
required changes should be taken into account when starting an SOD project.
The presented method constitutes a first step towards a comprehensive continuous compliance
monitoring framework that addresses the particularities of complex ERP systems. Further research
should focus on developing sound methods that can be used to automatically monitor system
transactions and system settings. Due to the fact that issues with segregation of duties usually stem
from a complex interaction of technical and non-technical activities that are usually not properly
reflected in the master data of an ERP system alone, further research should also concentrate on the
complex interplay of these types of activities and the media breaks that typically occur between
them.
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